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ABSTRACT.  Many retailers have been expanding into foreign markets, although not all such 
attempts at internationalisation have been successful.  This study examines the actions taken 
by Chilean retailers that negatively affected the operations of Home Depot, Carrefour and J.C. 
Penney in Chile.  The results show that the strategies employed by local companies have 
consisted in: (1) becoming informed about the company’s strengths and weaknesses, while 
imitating its best practices; (2) deepening their own market know-how and hiring high-level 
executives to lead defensive strategies: (3) opening stores in strategic places in order to win 
advantages concerning location; and (4) investing in technology and the training of 
employees.  The overall effect on the market has been one of concentration and consolidation 
of the retail industry. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Retail, internationalisation, Chile, success, foreign retailers, local defensive 
strategies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important changes in the last decade for the retail industry has been the rapid 
process of internationalisation of certain retail companies as an opportunity to enjoy greater 
growth and profitability.  Many of these companies already derive a great amount of their 
income from international operations.  For example, Wal-Mart operates more than 1,000 
stores in Canada, South America, Europe and Asia, which contribute to more than 25% of its 
total sales. 
 
The growth of the globalisation of retail companies has already arrived in Latin America.  In 
recent years, this part of the world has experience the arrival of big American and European 
retail chains with their experience and state-of-the-art technology.  In Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico, the three largest counties in the region, foreign chains such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour 
and Ahold have transformed themselves into important leaders (see Annex 1). 
 
The retail industry situation in Chile differs from other countries in Latin America.  It is worth 
noting that Chilean retailers have consistently defended their market against international 
enemies.  The biggest supermarket chains, department stores and home improvement stores 
are well-known local companies, all which strongly compete in this small market (see annex  
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Such strong competition has negatively affected multinationals’ attempts at 
internationalisation in Chile; i.e., they have not shown good performance there.  For example, 
Sears, J.C. Penney, Carrefour and Home Depot all pulled out of the Chilean market after 
having tried to operate in Chile for several years (Bianchi & Ostale, 2004).  In addition, 
retailers such as Wal-Mart and Casino have not even attempted to enter that market, despite 
having operations in neighbouring countries. 
 
The main objective of this study is to analyse how local retailers of an emerging country such 
as Chile adjust in order to compete with international companies that enter the market.  This 
study suggests that Chilean retailers have intelligently fought against competitors by 
employing several strategies such as (1) obtaining advance information about the foreign 
company’s strengths and weaknesses and imitating what it does best; (2) strengthening their 
own know-how about the market hiring competent executives to lead defensive strategies, (3) 
opening strategically-places stores in order to win advantages involving locations, and finally 
(4) investing in technology and the training of employees.  Such a formula has been successful 
for most of the retail sectors in Chile and has resulted in a greater consolidation, concentration 
and professionalisation of the retail industry, and in a greater offering to local consumers. 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Due to the growth of international activity, a large amount of literature has emerged on the 
subject, which examines the international activities of European, North American and 
Japanese retailers (Tordjman, 1988; Alexander, 1995; Robinson & Clarke-Hill, 1990; 
Treadgold, 1991; Dupuis & Prime, 1996; Sternquist, 1997; Arnold & Fernie, 2000; Sparks, 
1995; Clarke and Rimmer, 1997; Laulajainen, 1991; Wrigley, 1997; Goldman, 2001.  This line 
of investigation is composed mainly of case studies involving specific companies such as Wal-
Mart, Marks & Spencer, 7-Eleven and Carrefour (Sparks, 1995; Arnold & Fernie, 2000; 
Dupuis & Prime, 1996.  Despite the value such studies, there has as yet been little 
investigation concerning the performance of multinationals in emerging markets such as Latin 
America. 
 
The academic literature on retailing shows that companies that go international must confront 
barriers and cultural differences, which reduces their effectiveness when transferring their 
retail format that had been developed in a different context (Davies, 1995; Dupuis & Prime, 
1996; O’Grady & Lane, 1997).  Failures occur mainly because such companies underestimate 
the attractiveness of foreign market and lose sight of the importance of local players (Bianchi 
& Arnold, 2004).  For example, a recent case study concerning Royal Ahold’s experience in 
Latin America shows that this multinational company has faced great challenges when trying 
to transfer its retail format and practices to that area’s different institutional environments 
/Wrigley, 2003). 
 
A relevant aspect concerning local institutional environments which has been little approached 
and requires more investigation refers to strategies developed by local companies in order to 
defend their position when with the threat of international competition.  In studying the effects 
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of Wal-Mart entering Brazil, DaRocha and Rib (2002) pointed out the importance of local 
companies to react in order to defend themselves against this foreign enemy.  The same 
occurred with local Mexican companies when Wal-Mart entered Mexico.  As another 
example, Bianchi and Arnold (2004) analysed the operation of Home Depot in Chile and 
concluded that Chilean retailers proved be a large obstacle to that American company. 
 
In sum, the literature suggest that it is important to examine in a more detailed fashion the 
strategies and actions developed by local companies when faced with the threat of foreign 
competitors, since such local companies can drive the latter to fail.  Specifically, additional 
research is needed to understand which strategies are more successful in order to strengthen 
local companies against foreign rivals.  The aim of this paper is to approach this subject 
through the study of three retail sectors that managed to defend themselves against 
multinational companies that tried to operate in the Chilean market. 
 
MOTHODOLOGY 
 
The main objective of this research is to explore strategies developed by local retailers to 
defend themselves against foreign retailers.  To do so, three case studies were developed 
concerning defensive actions against multinational retailers that tried to operate in Chile: (1) 
J.C. Penney (1995-2000), (2) Home Depot (1998-2001), and (3) Carrefour (1997-2003). 
 
The data for this research were collected from a variety of primary sources (interviews and 
observation) and secondary sources (corporate documents, annual reports, studies and press 
articles).  Twenty semi-structured interviews were held during 2002, 2003 and 2004 with 
executives of the companies studied and with experts from the Chilean retail industry, such as 
retail managers, university professors, consultants, providers and executives of the main retail 
stores in Chile.  Furthermore, ten in-depth interviews were held with Chilean retail consumers 
concerning their experiences with the three companies. 
 
Context 
 
The Chilean retail market brought in US $ 24,525 million in 2003, which seems rather modest 
if compared to other countries of the region such as Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, where 
retail sales have ranged between US $41,000 million and US $214,000 million per year. 
However, among all the Latin American countries, Chile is the one that has shown the highest 
per capita retail sales rate, after Mexico, Of US $1,551 per year (see Annex 3). 
 
The three most relevant retail formats in Chile are the supermarket, the department store and 
the home-center, which correspond to approximately 45% of total retail sales. 
 
Case 1:  The Supermarket Sector 
 
In 2003 the supermarket industry in Chile experienced yearly sales approaching US $4,500 
million, with a real growth of 9,2% compared to the previous year, and which was equivalent 
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to 6,6% of the GDP (Professional Association of Supermarkets, ASACH, 2004).  Studies 
carried out in 2003 by AC Nielsen Chile reveal that 63% of the purchases that consumers 
make in Chile are done at supermarkets, which is a much higher figure compared to other 
countries of the region such as Argentina, Brazil and Peru.  Annex 4 displays information 
concerning the market share of the main supermarket chains at the end of 2004.  That table 
also compares the current situation with the one that existed in 1996, enabling one to notice 
the evolution and concentration of the industry. 
 
The history of the sector shows that in 1957 the first supermarket of the D&S chain, called 
Almac, was built in Chile, and in 1975 the first Jumbo hypermarket of the company Cencosud 
appeared.  In the mid ‘80s new supermarket formats arose and there was a period of continued 
growth in the industry. 
 
Beginning in 1997, the dominant local players began to prepare themselves against the 
imminent entry of large international chains.  For example, in 1998 D&S oponed 14 new 
stores with an investment of US $396 million and also began operating a modern distribution 
center in Santiago.  In 1998 Carrefour entered the Chilean market with its first hypermarket.  
In turn, Disco-Ahold International took control of 65.3% of the local Santa Isabel chain. 
 
During 1998, the effects of the Asian crisis began to show, which resulted in a reduction of 
sales (close to 2%) by similar stores.  Despite this fact, the big local chains continued to 
implement their investment plans, expecting a quick recovery of the economic situation of the 
sector. 
 
The period 2001-2002 was marked by the consolidation of the large chains, and in 2002 alone 
industry investments were around US $320 million.  During 2003 the sector experienced 
transcendental changes: the sale of Santa Isabel, owned by Ahold, to the local company, 
Cencosud, and of Carrefour to the local company, D&S.   Both international companies pulled 
out of the market, leaving the industry with 100% local players. 
 
D&S (Distribución y Servicio), owned by the Ibáñez family, is the principal supermarket 
chain in the country, with sales of US $1,958 million and 32.92% of the market share at the 
end of 2003.  The company began operations in 1957, when it opened its first supermarket 
called ALMAC in Santiago.  It gradually grew, and in 1984 opened its first EKONO discount-
type supermarket. 
 
Faced with the threat of Carrefour entering the market, in 1995 D&S introduced the discount-
type hypermarket under the trade name LIDER.  In 1996, D&S began trading on the stock 
exchange, and in 1997 the company entered the international financial market by registering 
its first ADR issuance on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE:DYS).  From 1997-2002, 
D&S made investments of US $889 million and managed to double the number of its stores in 
the same period.  Searching for new ways to grow.  D&S diversified into other business areas 
such as clothing and home products, financing, drugstores and coffee shops. 
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During 2003 the company invested a total of US $74.4 million in order to implement its 
“always-the lowest-price” strategy, in which it sought to always be 10% cheaper than the 
competition.  This new strategy entailed the standardization of ell its formats under the same 
trade name: LIDER.  In January 2004 D&S acquired all seven of Carrefour’s stores for US 
$124 million. 
 
Cencosud S.A. encompasses the Jumbo hypermarket, the Santa Isabel and Las Brisas 
supermarkets, and the Easy home-center, besides Las Verbenas Real Estate and Food and 
Fantasy.  In Chile, Cencosud has enjoyed sales of US $1,500 million per year.  The company 
was created by its current president, Horst Paulmann, who entered the supermarket business, 
he decided to undertake a new supermarket format by creating the first Jumbo hypermarket in 
Chile in 1976, located in Santiago, and which covered 7,000 square meters. 
 
In 1982 Cencosud began operations in Argentina with the opening of its first Jumbo, and in 
1988 it built its first regional Unicenter shopping mall in the country.  In 1993 the company 
expanded its shopping mall business to Chile with the opening of the Alto Las Condes mall.  
In 1993, Cencosud started a new business line in Chile and Argentina with its Easy format. 
 
The period 2003 through early 2004 was very important for Cencosud as it acquired 75 stores 
of the Santa Isabel chain and 236 stores of the Disco chain in Argentina, both belonging to the 
Dutch company, Royal Ahold.  Upon completing that operation, Cencosud held a 23% share 
of the Argentinean market. 
 
Local Retailer’s Actions Against Carrefour 
 
Carrefour is the second largest retailer in the world after Wal-Mart and operates more than 
9,000 supermarkets and hypermarkets in 30 countries (www.carrefour.com).  Carrefour 
showed net sales of US $79.6 billion for 2003, of which nearly 50% were international (M&M 
Planet Retail Report, 2003).  Carrefour is also the second largest retailer in Latin America and 
has operations its first hypermarket in Chile, but it remained small since it only managed to 
open seven stores in six years of operating there.  After five years of continuous losses, 
Carrefour occupied fifth place in the industry, with only 2.67% market share.  It publicly 
admitted having underestimated the solidity of the local competition and that it had failed by 
not having established a profitable position in Chile.  At the beginning of 2003, Carrefour 
publicly announced that it would implement a mores aggressive growth strategy in Chile; 
however, at the end of that year, it sold its stores and operations to D&S. 
 
D&S and Cencosud, both local retailers, fought fiercely against Carrefour.  When Carrefour 
entered the Chilean market in 1998, D&S has already studied Carrefour’s business models for 
some time and had copied what it did best.  D&S had learned a great deal from Spain and had 
studied its operations in Argentina for some years.  Although LIDER was not initially as 
technologically strong as Carrefour, it had the advantage of having been the first in its 
category and of having come to know the local market.  Furthermore, D&S had previously 
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acquired strategic locations before the arrival of Carrefour, which made it difficult and costly 
for Carrefour to find good locales. 
 
Case 2:  Department Stores 
 
Out of the total retail sales in Chile, about US $2,500 million derives from department store 
sales (Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Chile, 2004-National Chamber of Commerce).  There 
is fierce direct competition in the department store market in Chile, with a large national 
coverage on the part of three competitors:  Falabella, Ripley and Almacenes París. 
 
These chains are basically geared toward the middle and upper-middle class sectors of the 
population.  They also employ similar sales formats, bolster their sales with their own credit 
card, and they are involved in the real estate business by constructing malls.  In order to have 
reached such strong growth, these companies chose to professionalize and adapt their 
administrative structures to the new competitive environment and to encourage international 
expansion. 
 
Falabella has consolidated itself as the sector’s main company in Chile; it leads all other 
department stores (with an international presence in Argentina and Peru); it is the largest 
issuer of credit cards and the main owner and trader of chopping malls.  Its sales reached US 
$1,790 million in pesos in 2003, which represents a 23.92% growth in relation to 2002. 
 
Falabella began operations in 1889.  It has always been the pioneer in its category-it was the 
first to launch its own credit card.  The company has become diversified, offering other 
products such as travel, insurance, wedding lists and sales through Falabella.com.  In Peru, 
besides its “Saga Falabella” stores, it has made incursions into the hypermarket industry, 
opening the Tottus hypermarket in November 2002. 
 
In 2003, the merger between Falabella with the national chain Sodimac was finalized.  This 
conglomerate extends into Chile, Peru, Argentina and Colombia, with complementary 
business such as home centers, drugstores, shopping malls, supermarkets, banks, insurance 
and travel agencies. 
 
Ripley currently has 25 stores in Chile and five in Peru.  Among the department stores in Chile 
it occupies second place after Falabella, with sales of US $751 million in 2003.  Among its 
businesses are:  Banco Ripley (bank), Agencia de Viajes (travel), Seguros Ripley (insurance) 
and real estate investments. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, Ripley has pursued expansion, opening new stores both in regions 
outside of Santiago and in the city itself.  In 1997 Ripley created the company CAR S.A., 
which was conceived to administer its credic card business and bolster customer service.  In 
the same year, the company internationalised with the opening of its first store in Lima, Peru.  
In 2003 the company became an open public corporation and issued bonds of US $100 
million. 
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Almacenes Paris is structured into four business areas:  department stores, customer credit, 
real estate investment, and the manufacture of furniture and mattresses.  Almacenes Paris has 
further ventured into other business such as insurance, travel agencies and computing. 
 
Controlled by the Gálmez family, its origins date back to 1900, when the Paris furniture store 
was founded.  During the 1990s, it initiated a strong move toward the interior of the country to 
protect itself from J.C. Penney, and it invested US $327 million in order to reach its proposed 
goal of doubling the area meant for its stores.  From 2001 to date, the company has pursued a 
strong expansion plan both in Santiago and in the provinces, opening and remodelling new 
stores and issuing the Paris credit card.  During 2001 enjoyed sales of US $656 million, 
occupying third place in the industry after Falabella and Ripley. 
 
Retailer Actions Toward J.C. Penney 
 
J.C. Penney is one of the biggest department stores in the United States, with sales of US 
$17.7 billion in 2003 (M&M Retail Planet, 2003).  At the end of 2003, Penney ran 
approximately 1,000 department stores throughout the US and Puerto Rico, and 546 Renner 
department stores in Brazil. 
 
J.C. Penney began operations in Chile with a store in Santiago in 1995, located in the Alto Las 
Condes mall.  Although it had announced to the press its decision to increase the number of its 
stores en Chile, it was unable to reach its goal.  In September 1999, Penney publicly 
announced its intention to close operations in the country after 5 years of losses.  It sold its 
assets to the local competitor, Almacenes Paris. 
 
The company had faced serious problems such as space limitation and location.  Most 
shopping malls were owned by Penney’s largest competitors, such as Falabella, Almacenes 
París and Ripley.  Therefore, when the company arrived in Chile, the best locations had 
already been taken.  It could only open a store in the Alto Las Condes mall, which was owned 
by Cencosud, which did not take part in the department store business.  This stopped Penney 
from attaining the high sales volume that would enable it to cover costs and offer competitive 
prices. 
 
J.C. Penney’s director in Chile, Clinton Walker, recognized that his mistake was in nor having 
formed a partnership with local investors who had full knowledge concerning the market (La 
Tercera, September 29, 1999).  Besides, the operational and logistic expenses involved in 
maintaining only one store were too high and were not worth the Chile investment.  Although 
its objective was to open at least five stores to achieve better results, press agents stated that 
they could not find adequate expansion opportunities in the local market. 
 
Chile’s growth pushed J.C. Penney to enter the market without adequately taking the local 
market into consideration.  Therefore, they applied the same success strategies that they had 
used in their own market, but did not consider that in Chile the local companies were much 
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stronger.  In addition, they had invested a great deal to understand the Chilean market and to 
adjust to it.  According to Penney’s director in Chile, a local partner would have helped them 
avoid such losses and start from a solid base.  They should have formed a partnership with 
associates who knew the Chilean market well, since Chilean consumers had different tastes 
from consumers in the United States. 
 
Case 3:  Hardware and Home Improvement Stores 
 
Sales by the construction and hardware industry in Chile for the year 2003 were estimated at 
approximately US $4,000 million, but only 32% of the market corresponded to the four 
biggest retailers of home construction and repair materials: Sodimac (Home Center, 
Construction), Construmart, Easy and Home Store.  The remaining 68% was made up of 
thousands of hardware stores scattered through Chilean neighbourhoods. 
 
The hardware store retailer concept entered Chile 15 years ago, through Sodimac, with the 
introduction of the first self-service Home Center.  Previously, the industry had been 
composed of several small hardware stores that sold materials, tools and accessories to 
teachers and professionals.  The new concept, fashioned on the American and European 
markets, was rapidly accepted by consumers, clients and professionals.  Subsequently, it was 
imitated by Easy, which was owned by Cencosud, and was installed in a shopping mall. 
 
Between 1998-2001, Home Depot entered the market as the only foreign retailer, which 
offered a great variety of home construction and repair products.  However, in December of 
2001, Home Depot sold its operations in Chile to Falabella, and the store’s name became 
Home Store. 
 
During 2003 a very important change took place in the industry with the merger between 
Falabella and Sodimac.  After that alliance, from March 2004, the old Home Store shops, 
owned by Falabella, began operating under the name Sodimac. 
 
Sodimac is the biggest repair and construction materials retailer in Chile, with a 17.5% market 
share in 2003.  Sodimac was created in 1952, and over the next 30 years it transformed itself 
into the main construction materials distributor in Chile.  In 1982 Sodimac was acquired by 
Empresas Dersa, of the Del Rio group, and its stores were re-oriented toward a new segment 
of the market; products and services for home repair and maintenance.  In 1988 the first Home 
Center store was built, geared toward homeowners. 
 
In 1994 the company initiated activities in Bogotá, Colombia, commercially allied with the 
local group Corona, and in 1999 it arrived in Argentina, implementing its successful model 
experience from Chile.  In July 2003, the merger between Sodimac and Falabella was 
finalized.  After that deal, from March 2004, the six ex-Home Depot stores, owned by 
Falabella, began to operate under the Sodimac trade name. 
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Easy is owned by Cencosud and offers more than 50 thousand products, the most relevant of 
which relate to home construction and repair, together with decoration products.  During the 
years 2002-2003, the company pursued an aggressive expansion plan that included the 
opening of five stores and the purchase of another seven from the Proterra chain.  During 2003 
the Easy home centers chain enjoyed sales of US $183.5 million, attaining a 48% market 
share. 
 
Local Retailer Actions Toward Home Depot 
 
Home Depot is the world’s largest retailer for home improvement (home construction and 
repair) (M&M Planet, 2003).  It sells a broad assortment of materials, tools and accessories for 
home construction and repair at competitive prices.  It has more than 1,500 stores in five 
countries and had world-wide net sales of US $64.81 increase compared to 2000 
(www.homedepot.com). 
 
Home Depot started its internationalisation process in Canada in 1994; then, in Chile in 1998.  
Argentina in 1999 and Mexico in 2001.  To enter Chile, Home Depot associated itself with 
Falabella, an arrangement in which Home Depot owned 66.66% of the partnership and 
Falabella 33.33%.  The first store opened in August of that year and a second store opened in 
December of 1988.  By the end of the year 2000, Home Depot had already opened five stores 
in Chile: four in Santiago and one in Concepción.  These five stores had floor areas of over 
10,000 m2. 
 
Although it initially seemed that things were going to succeed, by the end of 2000, the press 
was already implying that Home Depot’s results had not been good, and that sales were 
smaller than its anticipated goals (América Economía, March 8, 2001).  Such disappointing 
results were attributed to the country’s recession, although its competitor, Sodimac had 
experienced sales and profit growth during the same period.  Finally, in October 2001, Home 
Depot announced its decision to withdraw from the market and sold its operations to its 
partner, Falabella. 
 
Upon analysing its actions affecting the management of Home Depot in Chile, one may notice 
that Sodimac was ready for Home Depot’s arrival.  Sodimac was a very tough competitor.  
When Home Depot announced its intention to start operating in Chile, Sodimac developed and 
implemented an aggressive strategic plan to strengthen its position; it hired new executives, 
several of whom had a great deal of experience in retailing, and implemented a new logistics 
distribution system.  In addition, it initiated a training system for all its employees (Capital, 
January, 2001) and continued with its store expansion strategy, opening a new one close to 
each new Home Depot.  Finally, it issued a corporate credit card. 
 
Another characteristic of the Chilean market is that there is a great deal pf communication 
among the industry’s players, a dynamic to which they resorted to strengthen themselves 
against Home Depot was not as big as it proclaimed and admitted that they had constantly 
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been offered less favourable terms when compared to Sodimac, due to Home Depot’s smaller 
sales volume and Sodimac’s ability to negotiate. 
 
CONCLUSIÓN 
 
In general terms, we can conclude that the failure of foreign companies to enter the Chilean 
market has been due to the strong competition posed by national chain, which, besides 
counting on high brand name recognition, also have great market and consumer know-how. 
 
The three cases studied show that when foreign retailers decided to enter Chile, they were 
faced with solid companies that counted on broad coverage, strategic location, market know-
how and legitimacy among the relevant players, which would also allow them to have an 
operating volume much greater than that of a recently-arrived foreign company.  Such gave 
them the advantage to negotiate with providers, among other factors. 
 
When the foreign companies announced their to enter the country, Chilean retailers, who had 
been studying these foreign companies’ international management for years, adapted an 
aggressive plan by hiring high-level executives for confronting their new competitors, and by 
also investing large sums in order to strengthen their trade name, geographical coverage and 
position in the industry. 
 
Thus, the mistake made by the three foreign companies studied was that they had given little 
importance to the actions and strategies employed by local competitors.  There was a lack of 
preparation to face such players, who were already successfully established in the local market 
and could rely on high brand name positioning. 
 
It is also important to consider that in the three sectors analysed, the local companies belong to 
familiar holding companies, which have been in the market for several years (see Annex 2).  
Such businesses are run by owners themselves, while the multinationals were generally run by 
foreign executives who could not even speak Spanish. 
 
The threat of multinational companies entering a small market like that of Chile has caused 
local retailers to examine the strategies of foreign companies around the world.  The 
hypermarket format and the “always-at-the-lowest-price” strategy have been the driving force 
behind D&S in terms of strategy implementation throughout the country.  In Chile, the “do-it-
yourself” concept of Home Depot had been copied and successfully implemented with a 
personal touch by Sodimac, long before the international company decided to enter the 
Chilean market. 
 
The competition that such industry presents on a global level has pushed Chilean retailers to 
invest in technology, logistics, and training and in improving their cost structure in order to 
strengthen their competitive position in the market.  All of this has led to aggressive public 
campaign and price wars, which increase the entry barriers to international companies. 
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Moreover, interacting with international retailers operating in Chile has given local companies 
the opportunity to learn new concepts related to the industry, such as logistics, customer 
service, technology and merchandizing, among others.  This shows how local retailers from all 
sectors have been taking advantage of local consumer knowledge through the implementation 
of strategies and the use of tools developed by foreign retailers. 
 
In addition, such strong competition has encouraged local retailers to expand into new markets 
and services.  In the three retail sectors studied, the market leaders all have operations abroad.  
For example, Falabella operates in Argentina and Peru; Ripley operates in Peru and Cencosud 
operates in Argentina through its Jumbo and Easy stores.  Sodimac also has business in 
Colombia and has just announced its entry into Peru.  With respect to new products and 
services, all these local retailers have incorporated corporate credit cards, the possibility of on-
line purchasing, a broad assortment of merchandize and complementary services. 
 
In sum, the analysis of the three sectors has suggested that the consistent reaction toward the 
threat from foreign companies has enabled the Chilean retail market in general to reach greater 
levels of consolidation and concentration, to make better offers to consumers and to 
incorporate best practices from foreign retailers. 
 
 
  
 12
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
AC Nielsen Chile (2003).  Report Annual.  Available at  
 www.acnielsen.cl/www.acnchile/index.htm. 
Alexander, N. (1995). “U.K. Retail Expansion in North America and Europe: A Strategic  
 Dilemma.”  Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Vol. 2, Nº 2, pp. 75-82. 
Arnold, S.J. Fernie (2000). “Wal-Mart in Europe: Prospects for the U.K.,” International  
 Marketing Review, Vol. 17, Nº 4/5, pp. 416-432. 
Bianchi, C.: Arnold (2004)”An Institutional Perspective on Retail Internationalisation 
Success:  Home Depot in Chile”.  International Review of Retail, Distribution, and 
Consumer Research, Vol. 14, Nº 2.pp. 149-169. 
Bianchi, C.; E. Ostalé (2004).  Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Internationalisation 
Attempts: Example of Multinational Retailers in Chile, Chile: Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, 
(Working paper, 47). 
Clarke, I.; P. Rimmer (1997).  “The Anatomy of Retail Internationalisation: Daimaru’s 
Decision to Invest in Melbourne Australia”.  The Services Industries Journal, Vol. 17 Nº 
3, pp. 361-382. 
Da Rocha, A.; Dib, L.A. (2002).  “The entry of Wal-Mart in Brazil and the competitive 
responses of multinational and domestic firms”.  International Journal of Retail and 
Distribution Management, Vol. 30, Nº 1, pp. 61-73. 
Davies, B.J. (1995). « The Regulation of Retail Internationalisation; Examples from the 
Pacific-Asia Region ».  IN: Mc.Goldrick, P.G.; G. Davies (Eds,), International Retailing: 
Trend and Strategies, London: Pitman Publishing. 
Dupuis, M.; H. Prime (1996).  “Business Distance and Global Retailing; A Model for Analysis 
of Key Success/Failure Factors”. International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management, Vol. 24 Nº 11, pp. 30-38. 
Goldman, A. (2000). “Supermarkets in China: The case of Shanghai”. International Review of 
Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, Jan. 2000, Vol. 10, pp. 1-21. 
Goldman, A. (2001). “The Transfer of Retail Formats into developing Economies: The 
Example of China”.  Journal Retailing, Vol. 77 Nº 2, pp. 221-242. 
Laulajainen, R. (1991). “Two Retailers go Global: The Geographical Dimension”.  
International Review of Retail Distribution and Consumer Research.  Vol. 1, Nº 5, pp.607-
626. 
M+M Planet Retail (2004).  Grocery Retailing Reports.  Mayo 2004.  Available at 
www.planetretail.net. 
______. (2004)  Top 30 Grocery Retailers in Latin America, 2003.  Press Release, 22 julio 
2004.  Available at www.planetretail.net. 
M+M Planet Retail (2004), “Top 30 Grocery Retailers Worldwide, 2003”.  Press Release, 1 
June 2004, www.planetretail.net. 
O’Grady, S.; H. Lane (1997).  “Culture: An Unnoticed Barrier to Canadian Retail performance 
in the USA”.  Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services.  Vol. 4 Nº 3, pp. 159-170. 
Robinson, T.M.; C.M. Clarke-Hill (1990).  “Directional Growth by European Retailers”, 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management Vol. 18, Nº 5. pp. 314. 
 13
Sparks, L. (1995). “Reciprocal Retail Internationalisation: The Southland Corporation Ito-
Yokado and 7-Eleven Convenience Stores”.  In: Akehurst G.; Alexander, N. (Eds.).  The 
Internationalisation of Retailing, London: Frank Cass & Co., London.  Pp. 57-96. 
Sternquist, B. (1997).  “International Expansion of U.S. Retailers”, International Journal of 
Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 25, Nº 8, pp. 262-268. 
Tordjman, A. (1988).  “The French Hypermarket: Could it be Developed in the United States” 
Retail and Distribution Management, Jul-Aug. 1988, Vol. 16, pp. 14-16. 
Treadgold, A. (1991). “Dixons and Laura Ashley: Different Routes to International Growth”, 
International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, Vol. 19, Nº 4, pp. 13-19. 
Wrigley, N. (1997).  “British Food Capital in the USA-Part 2:  Giant Prospects”, International 
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 25, Nº 2, pp. 48-58. 
Wrigley, N. (2003).  “The Stresses of Retail Internationalisation: Lessons from Royal Ahold’s 
Experience in Latin America”.  International Review of Retail, Distribution and 
Consumer Research, Jul. 2003, Vol. 13, Nº 3, pp. 221-243. 
 
 
***** 
 14
ANNEX 1.  Main Grocery Retailer by Country in 2003* 
 
 
 
 
Mexico  Argentina  
Wal-Mart 14.06% Carrefour 11.62% 
Soriana 4.38% Coto 5.67% 
CCM 4.22% Ahold 5.66% 
Gigante 3.67% Wal-Mart 4.34% 
OXXO 1.96% Cencosud 3.77% 
Others 71.71% Others 68.94% 
Total (US $mn) 86,986 Total (US $mn) 15,635 
 
Brazil  Chile  
Casino 877% D&S 32.92% 
Carrefour 7.27% Cencosud 21.40% 
Ahold 2.64% Unimarc 3.58 
Modelo Continente 2.46% San Francisco 3.22% 
SHV Makro 1.94% Montserrat 3.05% 
Others 76.92% Others 60.08% 
Total (US $mn) 54,041 Total (US $mn) 9,657 
 
*  Source: Grocery Retailing Reports, 2004; M+M Planet Retail. 
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ANNEX 2: Retail Industry in Chile in 2003* 
 
 
 
 
Chain Market 
Share 
Sales 2003 
MMUS$ 
No. 
Stores 
Ownership 
Supermarkets     
D&S 32.92 1,958.6 68 Ibáñez Family 
Cencosud 21.4 1,551.5 97 Paulmann Family 
     
Department Stores     
Falabella 40 1,790.3 28 Solari Family 
Ripley 17    751.4 24 Calderón Family 
Almacenes París 15    656.3 20 Gálmez Family 
     
Drugstores     
FASA 33    360.3 226 Codner Family 
Salcobrand 32    349.4 230 NA 
Cruz Verde 30.3    330.8 308 Harding Family 
     
Home Centres     
Sodimac 21.1    806.6 54 Del Río-Solari Family 
Easy 4.8    183.5 16 Paulmann Family 
 
*   Source:  Company Annual Reports, 2003; AC Nielsen Report 2003. 
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ANNEX 3.  Total Retail Industry by Country in 2003* 
 
 
2003 Total Sales Retail 
Industry 
 US $ (mn) 
Mexico 214,486 
Brazil 181,770 
Argentina   41,358 
Colombia   31,841 
Peru   26,780 
Venezuela   25,196 
Chile   24,525 
Guatemala   12,473 
Ecuador   10,233 
El Salvador     8,051 
Dominican Rep.     7,383 
Uruguay     4,071 
Paraguay     3,235 
 
Per Capita Retail Industry Sales by Country on 2003* 
 
2003 Per Cap. Total Retail 
Industry Sales 
 US $ (mn) 
Mexico 2,072 
Chile 1.551 
El Salvador 1,235 
Uruguay 1,193 
Argentina 1,076 
Brazil 1,019 
Guatemala 1,010 
Peru    986 
Venezuela    981 
Dominican Rep.    843 
Ecuador    787 
Colombia    720 
Paraguay    551 
 
*   Source Grocery Retailing Reports, 2004; M+M Planet Retail. 
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ANNEX 4.  Supermarket Industry Composition in Chile 
 
 
 
SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY MARKET SHARE                                                            
 IN 2003  IN 1996 
 
D&S * 31.92 D&S 19.20 
Cencosud ** 21.40 Santa Isabel 13.31 
Unimarc   3.58 Unimarc   8.45 
San Francisco   3.22 Jumbo   6.31 
Montserrat   3.05 Montserrat   4.21 
Montecarlo   2.68 Las Brisas   4.11 
Rendic   2.45 San Francisco   2.02 
Bigger   1.44 Montecarlo   1.82 
Bryc   1.34 Marmentini   1.65 
Korlaet   1.27 Agas   1.60 
Economax   1.25 Others 37.32 
Others 25.40 
 
 
*    Including Líder, Líder Mercado, Líder Vecino, Líder Express and Carrefour. 
 
**  Including Jumbo, Las Brisas, Santa Isabel, Tops, and Extra. 
 
Source:  Asociación Gremial de Supermercados de Chile, ASACH. 
